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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE 0. PATTERSON and
E'DNA PATTERSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
MAX WILCOX and
BEN D. BROWNING,

Case No. 9278

Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action involves title to the m'inera}l rights
of 400 acres of land situated in Township 31 South,
Range 26 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, San
Juan County, Utah.
Plaintiffs and Respondents, George P'atterson
and Edna Patterson, his wife, commenced this action against the appellants, Max Wilcox, Ben D.
Browning, and dthers to quiet title to the lands
in question.
1
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Respondents Patterson did not introduce any
evidence of their title.
The evidence of title in Wilcox and Browning,
appellants, appears from defendant's exhibit 1, (reproduced herein for reference), which is a quit
claim deed from respondents George Patterson and
Edna Pa:terson, his wife, to Max Wilcox. Wi)lcox
testified that he and his wife delivered a quit claim
deed to appellant Ben D. Browning to an undivided
one-half interest in the minerals conveyed to appellant Wilcox by respondents, Patterson. (TR. 36).
This case presents a single question for review by this Court; n·amely, the construction and
effect of the quit claim deed by Patterson to Wilcox
(defendant's exhibit 1).
In the lower Court the respondents directed
their attack toward the circumstances surrounding
the consideration for the deed rather than the intent of the parties or the provisions of the deed. They
attempted to rescind the deed and an attendant
agreement (defendant's exhibit 2), for alleged misrepresentations of apperlants.
In this connection the evidence showed that
an agreement (defendant's exhibit 2) was entered
into between appe'llant, Max C. Wilcox and respondent, George Patterson, wherein it was provided for
the conveyance of certain unpatented mining claims
and "all the mineral rights" to 400 acres of land
2
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for a consideration of $5,000.000 cash and 5,000
shares of stock at par value of $1.00 per share in
a corporation to be formed. Ben D. Browning, one
of the appellants, paid to George 0. Patterson the
sum of $5,000.00 in cash on April 28, 1955. On
July 17th, 1955, a certificate of stock in Plateau
Mining Corporation, representing 5000 shares at
the par valtle of $1.00 per share, was delivered to
respondents Patterson by appellant Wilcox. This
corporation had been formed on February 28, 1955
pursuant to the laws of the State of Nevada. Respondents contended that the fact that the corporation
had been formed prior to execution of the agreement (Defendants' Exhibit 2) amounted to misrepresentation and thus entitled them to rescind the
agreement and the deed. However, the evidence
showed that the date of incorporation is part of
the corporate seal of Plateau Mining Corporation
and this seal was clearly affixed to the stock certificate. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A"). Respondents
or their agent had possession of the stock certificate
for approximately four years and therefore, had the
means of knowing the date of incorporation for
some four years before they commenced this action.
(Tr. 22). Appellants moved to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaint at the conclusion of their case on the following grounds: ( 1) That the action was barred by
the three year statute of limitations (78-12-26
3
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U.C.A. 1953), (2) that no material or other misrepresentation of fact had been made to respondents and, (3) that respondents never had offered
to restore the status quo, name'ly to return the
$5,000.00 cash consideration which they had received. (Tr. 52). The court then stated:
"I am of the opinion and so hold that the
comp'laint, the amended complaint of the plaintiff should be and is dismissed. Even if it be
conceded that the provisions in the contract
relative to the formation of the corporation
is a material provision of the contract, it
seems to me that if that is the only fraud
that can be shown, that the statute of limitations applies and the action is barred by
the provisions of the statute cited to the court
which I need not mention because counsel are
both familiar with them . . . I don't think
there was any intent on the part of the, there
isn't any intent on the part of the defendant
shown by the evidence at any rate to deceive
in any way the plaintiff. I don't think I need
say more, gentlemen." (Tr. 53).
This ruling of the court is reflected in the
findings of the court. (R. 75). Respondents have
not appealed from the order of court dismissing
their amended complaint, and hence, the allegations
of that complaint and issues raised thereby are not
before the court on appeal. We burden this brief
with a recital of the action of the lower court in
regard to respondents' amended complaint merely
to show the background of this action and to fur4
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ther show that the entire case of respondents was
devoted to attempting to focus the attention of the
lower court on matters which proved to be without
substance, and to thus avoid the real issue in the
case, namely the effect of the quit claim deed (Defendants' Exhibit 1).
At the close of respondents case and upon the
dismissa'l of their amended complaint, the sole issue
remaining was whether as against respondents, appellants had title to "all the mineral rights" including oil and gas underlying the 400 acres of land
n1entioned and described in the quit claim deed.
The lower court in its memorandum decision ruled
that appellants did not and construed the deed as
severely restricting the grant therein contained.
( R. 68) . This brief will show that the court erred
in this regard and that its decree in this particular
must be reversed.

5
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
APPELLANTS' TITLE TO ALL THE MINERALS
INCLUDING OIL AND GAS UNDERLYING THE 400
ACRES DESCRIBED IN DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT "A"
(QUIT CLAIM DEED) IS GOOD AND VALID AND
THE DECREE OF THE LOWER COURT HOLDING
OTHERWISE IS ERR·OR.

6
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS' TITLE TO ALL THE MINERALS
INCLUDING OIL AND GAS UNDERLYING THE 400
ACRES DESCRIBED IN DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT "A"
(QUIT CLAIM DEED) IS GOOD AND VALID AND
THE DECREE OF THE LOWER COURT HOLDING
OTHERWISE IS ERROR.

The sole question before the court is to determine what was conveyed by the quit claim deed.
The answer to that question depends on the intent
of the parties as shown by the deed. The terms of
the deed and the words of grant are clear and unan1biguous.
Briefly summarized, the deed states and conveys:
( 1) 30 mining claims. (1)
(2) "All mineral rights" to the following· named parcels of land. (The
legal description follows)
( 3) An .e,asement for the purpose of
mining said properties and conducting all operations incidental
thereto including, but not limited
to, ex]!loration, development and
surveytng.
Each of the words of grant are consistent with
the removal of oil and gas, and there is no suggestion that the parties intended otherwise.
( 1) The 30 mining claims are not an issue in this case. They were
unpatented claims and by Federal law oil and gas is not subject
to location under the n1ining laws. 30 U.S.C. §193.

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The meaning attributed by 'law to the term
"mineral rights" includes extraction of oil and gas.
NOTE: The term ''mineral right'' ordinarily embraces oil and gas, 58 C.J.S. Mines & Minerals §2b ( 4).
"Unless it appears in a particu1l'ar case
that it is used in a more restricted sense, the
term "mineral" ordinarily embraces oil or
petroleum and natural gas''.
NOTE : The term "mining" includes the extraction
of oil and gas, 58 C.J.S. Mines & Minerals
§3C (2).
'' ... In accordance with the recognition of
oil and gas as minerals as discussed supra
§2b ( 4) , and by common usage, the extraction
or production of oil or gas from the earth is
now generally regarded as mining, ... ".
The terms exploration, dev.eloprnwnt and s~trvey
are each terms of general meaning and are applicable to the extraction of oil and gas.
This Court has held (and settled the question
in this state) that oil and gas was included in a
reservation of ... "·atl coal, gold, silver, lead, copper and other precious and valuable ores, n1inerals,
mines and mining rights." See Western Development Company vs. Nell, 288 Pac. 2d 488 (Utah).
Certain of the rulings in tl1e \\restern Development case are particularly pertinent to the case
at bar.
8
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"\Vhile it is true that the absence of references to rights and privileges connected
with oil developn1ent has been held to demonstrate a lack of intention to convey gas and
oil, (citing cases) the modern trend is apparently to give greater weight to the strict
definition of the term 'minerals" and to interpret the easements appropriate to mining
as merely additional surface rights."
''The trial court admitted the extrinsic
evidence offered by appellants, but determined
the issue of intent against them. The burden
of persuasion remained with the parties who
asserted that the grantor in both deeds here
under consideration intended to convey less
than the estate attributed by law to the word
"minerals", and hence, we must examine that
evidence to determine whether or not it is of
such substance as to compel a finding that oil
and gas rights were not intended to be included in the reservation and grant."
"All the evidence introduced was equivocal in its meaning, and thus appellants have
failed to prove by extrinsic evidence that the
intention of the parties was other than to
grant what is genera'l'ly accepted as within
the term 'minerals."
The burden of persuasion throughout the trial
remained with respondents Patterson to show that
their gran't meant less than the estate attributed
by law to the term 'mineral rights", and this they
did not do ; that burden was never even undertaken
by respondents, let alone satisfied. The ruling of
the Western Development vs. Nell supra, compelled
9
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the lower court to find that the estate conveyed by
respondents is all substances legal'ly cognizable as
minerals, including oil and gas. 37 ALR 2d 1440.
The lower court recognized the rule that a
conveyance of "minerals" or "mineral rights" includes oil and gas? The court so stated in its memorandum decision.

"I recognize the rule that unless a contrary intention is manifested, (2) the term
"mineral" or 'mineral rights" include gas
and oil". (R. 69).
How then did the lower court arrive at its
erroneous conclusion that grantors coveyed an estate less than "all minerals", including gas and oil?
The record discloses only two possible sources for
such a conclusion, neither of which support it; one
item being the grazing lease entered into by respondents Patterson and appellant Wilcox more than
three years after delivery of the deed, the second
being the royalty reservation contained in the deed.
See Paragraph 7 of the Findi11g of Fact (R. 75)
and the court's memorandum decision (R. 68).
(2) "Manifest is a very strong word, a degree stronger than than
'evident', the mind getting the truth as by an intuition. It is
defined as meaning .
obvious to the mind or to the understanding; plain; open; unmistakable; indisputable . . . ". 55
CoJ .S. p. 6220
0

o
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First, the "grazing lease".

It is dated October 1, 1958, more than three
years subsequent to the execution of the quit claim
deed and cannot be considered a contemporaneous
instrument. Paragraph 4 of the lease (R. 95) contains the language relied on by respondents in regard to intent. It states:
"It is further understood and agreed that
this lease does not include any mineral rights
whatsoever and that the Lessors specifically
reserve the right to occupy so much of the
surface of the demised premises as may be
necessary or convenient for any mining operations conducted by Lessors or those acting
by their authority, and that no compensation
will be paid to Lessee for such right.''
This lease neither referred to, nor cancelled,
nor amended .the quit claim deed conveying "a:Il
1ninerals." It's simple effect must be to clarify the
lease to the extent that no mineral rights passed by
the terms of the lease. To give it effect as qualifying the deed woud require a conclusion that "all
minerals" co11veyed by the deed were cancelled by
the lease. Such construction of the lease seems wholly
inconsistent with the 'lease provision ... "this lease
does not include any mineral rights."
The lease language, rather than casting doubt
1tpon the deed, merely r-ecognizes its existence and
harmonizes tl~e prior acts of the parties.
Furthermore, the grazing lease covers approxi11
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m·ately 3000 acres of land owned by respondents in
the same general area as that described in the deed.
The deed conveys all minerai rights to only 400 acres
of land. When seen in this context, the paragraph
quoted above assumes its proper proportion and
shows recognition of rights not only embraced in the
quit claim deed but perh·aps other grants by respondents or rights not yet conveyed by respondents.

12
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The

Rcsc;·vatio?~

of Royalty

The lower court in Paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact states:
" . . . That from the face of said unrecorded quit claim deed itself, the use of the
term "mineral rights" it was intended to include only minerals and ores that were to be
treated by m1lls and against which there was
haulage allowance and penalty for high lime
contents, namely, uranium, thorium, vanadium and other fissionable source 1naterials
and all associated and related minerals and
did not cover and include other minerals such
as oil and gas with the premises."
The deed granted "a'll mineral rights" to (legal
description follows). The royalty reservation states:
''Grantors further reserve the right and
impose an obligation upon these properties to
t~1e extent of 10
of all minerals reserved
by this deed as determined by gross mill receipts, less haulage allowance and pena lties
for high lime content. Said ore payment
to terminate when such payment shall be paid
in the sum of $5,000,000.00."

ro

1

In the absence of ambiguity the court was required to give full force and effect to the plain
n1eaning of the deed. When the court failed to hold
that gas and oil was included in this deed, such conclusion is in direct conflict with the granting clause
of "all minera l rights" and had the effect of remaking the deed between the parties. The only
1
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source in the deed from which the court could have
reached such a conclusion comes from 'the reservation of royalty. It is obvious that the lower court
concluded that the royalty reservation reflected an
intention of the parties to convey those minerals and
ores treated by mills and concluded that this excluded gas and oil minerals. To reach this result the
court has construed this deed most favorab'ly to the
grantor and against the grantee. A reasonable construction of the deed giving full effect of the granting clause of "all mineral rights" would have been
to construe the royalty reservation to impose 107o
royalty on all minerals reserved by the deed after
deducting all allowa11ces and penalties for high lime
content and as to the minerals not subject to milling, haulage, and high lime content there would be
no royalty. To construe this granting clause as being modified by the reservation is to extend the
reservation beyond its terms. The rule of construction applicable to reservations is found in 26 C.J.S.
Deeds, sec. 140 ( 1) :

''A reservation or exception will be given
effect according to the p'lain meaning and intent of the language used. What was reserved
must be determined from a construction of
the reservation clause, which is to be construed
more strictly than a grant. It cannot be extended beyond its terms."
The fact that it is not permissable to construe
14
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a deed more strongly in favor of the grantor against
the grantee is found in 26 C.J.S. Deeds, sec. 140(2):
" ... as a general rule, reservations and
exceptions expressed in a doubtful manner
are, conformable to the rule applicabte to
deeds generally, ... construed most strongly
against the grantor and in favor of the grantee." 26 C.J .S. Deeds, sec. 140 ( 2).
Nothing in the record, nothing in the dPrcl ~11il
no rule of construction will permit the royalty reservation to override and destroy the grant.
The reservation of royalty presents the question of what minerals are subject to royatty and
not whether the reservation affects the clear and
unequivocal terms of the grant.
The key words in the clause are "mill receipts"
and "ore". They are defined in 'law.
Milling
"In mining parlance, the process of separating the materials found together, and extracting from the mass the particular natural
product desired." 58 C.J.S. §3, Page 49.
Ore

''The term ore designates the compound
of a metal 'and some other substances; a metalliferous mineral or rock. It is generally regarded as a mineral." 58 C.J.S. §2 ( 5).
"Less haulage allowance and penalty for high
15
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lime con'tent"merely define the method of computing the net royalty. (3)
The only platlsible construction of the royalty
reservation is that respondents reserved ten (lOra)
percent of metalliferous ores produced from the
mining claims and the 400 acres, computed on the
basis of net mill returns free of development and
haulage costs. The trial court evidently adopts this
view as to the nature of respondent's royalty.
We again state that the court's finding from
the royalty reservation of an intent not to convey
oil and gas extended the reservation beyond its p1ain
terms and beyond all rules of construction.
Even if it were conceded for the purpose of
argument that the reservation is ambiguous (the
grant concededly is not), when the deed is viewed
in the light of settled rules of construction the total
effect is still a grant of "all mineral rights" including oil and gas.
The rule fol'lowed in this State is that the whole
deed will be considered and effect given to all its
terms. Coltharp vs. Coltharp, 160 Pac. 121 (Utah,
Wood vs. Ashby, 253 Pac. 2d 351 (Utah), Haynes
vs. H~tnt, 85 Pac. 2nd 861 (Utah).
( 3) The trial court in its men1orandum decision states that it is a
m~atter of common knowledge that those terms referred to processes and practices re}ative to the extrac·tion of uranium and
vanadium. If that be a fact, we do not learn it from the record
and the court was not asked by respondents to take judicial
notice of any matter. The decision of the trial court should
have been ba:sed upon matters of evidence presented by the
parties and made a part of the record.

16
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With this rule in n1ind and giving effect to the
ordinary meaning of the wo1·ds used, it is still apparent that the estate conveyed includes oil and gas.
Other settled 1·ules of construction point unerringly to the same result
"It is generally conceded tha't a deed is to
be construed most strongly against the grantor and most favorably to the grantee." Wood
vs. Ashby (supra).
"The general rule is well settled tha't if
there is any ambiguity in a deed so that it
is capable of two possible constructions, one
of which will be more favorable to the grantee,
the other of which will be more favorable to
the grantor, that method of construction
which will be more favorab'le to the grantee
will be selected and the deed will be construed
against the grantor." 16 Am. Jur. Deeds
Seco 1C5.
See also 16 Am. Jur. Deeds Sections 170 and
171.
The same rule applies to the construction of
the royalty resrvation.
"A reservation or exception will be given
effect according to the plain meanjng and intent of the language used. What was reserved
must be determined from a construction of
the reservation clause, which is to be construed more strictly than a grant. It cannot
be extended beyond its terms." 26 C.J.S.
(Deeds) Sec. 140 ( 1).
" ... as a general ru'le, reservations and
exceptions expressed in a doubtful manner
are, confarmable to the rule applicable to
17
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deeds generally, . . . construed most strongly
against the grantor and in favor of the grantee." 26 C.J.S. (Deeds) Sec. 140(2).
"Also, in virtue of the rule that a grant
is construed most strongly against the grantor when the language of an exception or
reservation is ambiguous or doubtful, it will
be construed in such way as to resolve doubts
against the grantor in favor of the grantee,
for the grant wilt not be cut down by the subsequent reservation to any extent beyond that
indicated by the intention of the parties as
gathered from the whole instrument." 16 Am.
Jur. Deeds, §309.
One further observation. The contention was
made in Western Development Company vs. Nell
(supra) tha:t the fact that oil and gas development
was of minor importance in this state in 1916 demonstrated that the parties did n(jt have these minerals in mind when the deeds were made. The court
said:
"It appears to us that the mere fact that
a particular mineral had not been discovered
in that vicinity would not preclude the granting of right2 to such a mineral or limit a
grant of 'minerals' to something less general
than all the substances legally cognizable as
minerals."
The quit claim deed was made in April, 1955.
A major oil field was discovered at Aneth, San
Juan County~ Utah in 1954. This lends compelling
force to the fact that the parties intended that the
grant of "all mineral righ'ts" included oil and gas.
18
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CONCLUSION
In this action it was incumbent upon respondents to prove that they intended to convey an
estate less than that contemplated by the term "all
minerall rights". This, they did not, indeed, could
not do.
The plain unmistakenable terms of the deed
show that "all mineral rights" had been conveyed
to appellants, subject only to a 10
royalty on
metalliferous ore produced from the mining claims
and the 400 acres of fee title land.

ro

The findings and decree of the lower court
holding that the terms of a grazing lease and the
terms of the royalty reservation show an "interpretation" and intent not convey oi'l and gas are
not founded on substantial evidence or any evidence
whatsoever and must be reversed.
This court should instruct that a decree be
entered quieting appellant's title to "all mineral
rig·hts" subject only to respondents 10
royalty
on metalliferous ore free of development and haul-.
age cost.

ro

Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD M. GARRETT
Attorney for Appellants
1307 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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------------A~-------------------

to

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
GEORGE 0. PATTERSON and
of
Moab
QUIT-CLAIM

to

ED~

L. PATTERSON, his wife
pmtor s
Grand
, State of Utah, hereby

Mli«~lldx
MA.X C. WILCOX

grantee

of Moab, Grand County 1 State of Utah

for the sum of

Ten and no/100----------------------------------------------~LLAJS
the following described tract
of land in
Sa a Juan
County,
State of Utah:

30 Mining claims, designated Lower Valley, Nos. I through 30
all located in R 26 E, 31 S, Salt Lake Meridian, as further ftJ,n
by the official reo rds of the San Juan County Recorder. Reserving, nevertheless, surface rights to the grantors. And,
all mineral rights to the following named parcels of land, to
wit:
"SEiNEt; NE~SEt; SEtSEt; Section 8, and NWL; NltSWt
Section 9 Township 31 South, Range 26 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian" Commonly known as the
W.H. Coefield property. And,
"The East t of th~ Northeast Quarter of Section
Seventeen in Township 31 South, Range 26 cast,
Salt Lake Meridian." Containing 80 acres.
Together with an easement of way to the grantee ol his assigns
to the above described parcels of property for the purpose of
mining said properties and conducting all operations incidental
thereto including but not I imited to exploration, development
and surveying.
Gr a n t or s f u r t h e r r e s e r v e t h e r i g h t an d i mp o s e • n o b I i g a t i on
upon these properties to the eatent of ten percent of all
minerals reserved by tbis deed as determined by grossmill
receipts less haulage allowance and penalties for high lime
content~ said ore payment to terminate when such payments
shall be paid in the sum of $5,ooo.ooo.oo
fifty t ve.

clay of

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

On the
thousand nine hundred and

clay of
penoaally appeued before me

the signer of the foresoina inltrummt, who claly ICbcnrleclae to me mat

he

same.
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